1)‘The only thing required for evil to triumph, is for good men to do nothing. Lord Acton

2) ‘What must be avoided at all costs is a fundamental deprivation of justice under the law’ Justice Estey (St. Anne Nackawic)

3) old aphorism:  Not to decide is to decide.’

4) ‘…Everybody conspires, nobody gets done. But if it’s cover-up time, God help us all….The Mission Song  John LeCarré

5)’...Justice System as slow, costly and dangerously flawed.’  newly appointed SC of C Justice Richard Wagner


A) “Res ipsa loquitur’ is Latin. It means ‘the thing speaks for itself’… In malpractice lawsuits, prosecuting attorneys who successfully argue res… are guaranteed a significant payday. You see, our court of law is based upon the premise that we’re innocent until proven guilty. Res… turns that premise on its head. It says, because something happened and normally that something shouldn’t have happened, you, the accused, are guilty of causing it to happen. Therefore you are guilty of malpractice…That’s the given, just like the attorney can argue that the patient entered the operating room for a toe operation and left with one leg missing….”

 A Heartbeat Away Michael Palmer


B) As the senior West Vancouver teacher concerned, I was ‘laid off’ for reasons of declining enrolment (there wasn’t any)  in June of 1985 by a Superintendent’s letter which did not have the School Board authorization which he claimed. The court quashing the rigged arbitration said as much. Over 20 judges including the SCofC on a number of occasions have never had a hearing to reveal that falsehood. No other teachers were laid off that year but a myopic media bought into the propaganda of ‘why lay off a junior teacher when a less satisfactory senior teacher was available for the purpose?’ (SEE web: REDNECK MEDIA)

 It is this systematic judicial cover-up of this issue which has reduced Canada to ‘failed state’ status.


7) Many of the self-represented litigants Windsor law professor Julie MacFarlane interviewed have lost faith in the justice system. “People are really angry,” she says. “What is it exactly we are offering people when we say access  (my underlining RWC) to justice? If we continue to use it as a mantra without really delivering on it, and we don’t listen to what people are saying, I don’t know where this is going but down….”  Lawyerless litigants ‘treated with contempt’   Don Butler Ottawa Citizen Jan.02-13 A1




for APPEAL OF SURETY PAYMENT CA038538 (Nov. 26-12 hearing date/Jan. 16-13 filing date)

NB For the sake of economy, ‘the plaintiff’ will be subplanted by the personal pronoun ‘I’


1) This is a petition for judicial review of a surety assignment.


2) This Appeal is based on a telephone call made by the Supreme Court of Canada’s Registry’s  Miss Dorota in early February in which she makes claim that the Registry of the Vancouver Court System is prepared to extend the time limit to appeal the CA038538 Surety Hearing. While no name was given from the B.C. Registry; the name Maria Littlejohn appears to be the connecting factor.


3) According to Miss Dorota,  it is the position of the Vancouver Courts that I have access to the courts according to the Rules. Paradoxically, I do not, I submit, have access to the courts according to the ‘MacKenzie Creed’ which bars me from any such participation. See APP. I for an unresponded letter on October 01-2012 to B.C. Appeal Court Justice Lance Finch, my self- appointed proxy in this matter outlining the ramifications of the MacKenzie Creed to be developed further along in this memorandum.


4) The following is a pejorative background account as to my lay-off as a senior teacher in West Vancouver in June of 1985 under the auspices of BILL 35 which was only used against me and withdrawn before legalities could be completed. This account is completely lacking from the dirth of legal materials over the 28 year course of this unresolved legal case in which no compensation has been paid.

(i) In March of 1985, I mailed evidence to the Ministry of Education in Victoria outlining an alleged fraud on the part of West Vancouver Secondary principal, John Williams. He had converted a ‘satisfactory’ principal’s report from a positive to a negative and I caught him. Justice Mary Southin recognized that problem from secret memos she received from the School District as she opined how difficult it would be for the School District to pursue me under the School’s Act. In quashing the arbitration ruling, as she did, the arbitrator to be ‘patently unreasonable’ ; she noted…’Had the arbitrator found a purpose outside the statute, his duty would have been to reinstate Mr. Callow.’

(ii) Hence BILL 35 was born with this problem in mind which permitted the School District to hide a dismissal behind a lay-off. The precedent set now is that any employer may evade their fiduciary obligations under the collective bargaining rules with this line: ‘If you do not sign a $1 settlement, you will not collect your pension’. No employee will hold Union membership nor contribute to a Company pension scheme under those conditions.

(iii) When the Employer failed to return to arbitration as ordered by Justice Southin after they failed to return employment as recommended by the court, further litigation was ordered which was never carried out.

(iv) The cornerstone of this refusal by the Employer lay in the fact that they curtailed salary provisions on November 4,1985 before the arbitration was hardly under way and, consequently,  felt no compunction to do anything, particularly as no judge ordered the resumption of those fees until the resolution of this case. To be sure if I had been on salary which exists apart from legal outcomes, the Employer would not have left this matter hanging for 28 years without a resolution. In short, they set the clock ticking with their refusal and have never been held accountable for that failure although they were provided an opportunity to justify their inaction recently in Ontario Superior Court. (Maranger Decision #12-54944  November 01-2012 now under appeal in Divisional Court #DC-12-1872)

 (v) When the employer failed to return to arbitration as so ordered by the court, I launched an action before B.C. Supreme Court Judge, Justice Spencer in 1995. He specifically pointed out that I was ‘…not to be made a victim of the abuse of authority….’ Regrettably, he did not see fit to order the matter back to arbitration leaving this case in limbo  as well as leaving the impression that the Order for re-arbitarion was not seriously made. 

(vi) Indeed, the Appeal Court which the Employer called contesting Southin’s action over the ‘imposed’ as opposed to ‘consentual’ were more blunt according to my witness who reported that legal counsel were called to the bench and were ‘invited’ to settle the matter out of court. That template was the one followed by Justice Spencer and every justice since that time. No doubt he was only too aware, as Justice Southin had been, that any new arbitration would not only bring into sharp focus the perfidy of the Employer but the purjury committed by Employer witnesses. Hence an outside settlement was the court’s only option.

5) Much is made of my failure to accept the Employer’s offer of settlement. Preposterous! If two litigants disagree, then the proper course is for a judicial finding else why have a judiciary?


6) The key phrase from the above court case launched in 2004 in the Supreme Court of Canada which was not heard includes the reasons for why the court may function under their powers of inherent jurisdiction which are being applied here.


7) It needs be noted that it was the failure of the Supreme Court of Canada to hear this issue under the ‘ultimate remedy’ provisions of the collective agreement which led to my declaration that Canada has been reduced to a Third World State. APP. II    SEE APPENDIX  BELOW FOR SCofC MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT  (a must read for legal interests)


8) With any other rejection by the Supreme Court of Canada, the plaintiff is left with a lower court decision. In the Employee’s Case (Canada) as it is euphemistically known on my blog, that meant that I was left with nothing as, under the unique circumstances of this case, there is no lower court decision. My legal advisor’s comment was that ‘you have exhausted all remedy under the law’ thus giving rise to my doppelgänger, ‘The Outlawed Canadian’.


9) Litigation continued into which a new element was introduced; the ‘MacKenzie Creed’



10) In that un-numbered action, Deputy Justice B.C. Supreme Court Anne MacKenzie, on her own recognizance, without taking argument nor quoting pertinent laws and for reasons best known to herself, dropped my submission S106159 laid in September of 2010. It appeared that her Order was to disappear down the same black hole that S106159 would go without anything showing on the judicial record.  I have labeled that pernicious action as ‘running a court within a court’ under which no justice system may survive. It is the cover-up of that action by the B.C. Courts, the Federal Court, The Supreme Court of Canada, and more recently, the Superior Court of Ontario which has reduced Canada to the level of ‘a failed state’.


11) No court wishes to examine that Creed and, it would appear, doing their utmost to keep any discussion of that document out of the Judicial Record. The Supreme Court of Canada is stalling on the last 5 Appeals on this basis; the next Appeal to be labeled SCofC – VIII ‘FUBAR’


12 If history is to repeat itself, it would seem the two most recent appeals in either Ontario (APP. IV) or this one in B.C. is little more than a road-bump to providing the Supreme Court of Canada with definitive material in which no further procrastination is possible under Section 40.


13) Under the terms of the courts ‘inherent powers’ which have been developed in full in APP.II, I submit this court has the power to quash the MacKenzie Creed as being ‘ultra vires’ and return this litigant to employment with all terms of the contract to apply.  Those are not mutually exclusive events.


14) The only consideration for the court with this request is that they take the above action on the sole grounds that the Employer failed to obey a court Order,the reasons being of no consequence. The employer may pursue other parties in separate actions should they feel aggrieved.


15) While I do not see anything good coming out of the ‘MacKenzie Creed’; nonetheless, the above action would satisfy some of the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Act as compensation would be seen to have been paid which is a key concept of that Agreement. Further, that decision would be of no small gain as well as putting an end to the current litigation of a case which has tied the Canadian Judiciary in knots.


16) As to the payment of surety funds, (APP. V), considering that CA038538 was never held due to court administration actions and for which the surety was paid; what right did the presiding judge have to decide that the ruling  would  be in favour of the Employer and, as such, to determine to whom and what expenses should apply? While I may conclude that the MacKenzie Creed barred me from that hearing; the hearing judge would merely show it on the judicial record as ‘non-attendance’ on my part. That is the insidious nature of this Creed as it bars me from pursuing the Employer but there is no similar counter control over actions of that Employer.


Questions at Law


17) To which courts does the MacKenzie Creed Apply?  When the Employer did not see fit to attend the Federal Court to defend her action leaving a vacuum filled by the B.C. Attorney General, was the Employer citing this Creed for their non-attendance?  Further, what standing would the Employer have should they have wished to appeal the Federal Court Decision? Also, is the Supreme Court of Canada able to cite the Creed as to why I have no recognition  at that level?


18) No notice of appearance from the Employer and a non-attendance form received from the Ontario Attorney General leaves the Divisional Appeal Court (DC-12-1872) in a quandary  as to how to proceed with an appeal in that court focusing on the MacKenzie Creed. I have agreed to a ‘letter by letter’ discussion of this issue with the Employer should the court so wish. Ducking out here is NOT an option for this court. Again, how would the Employer proceed should they wish to appeal this Action?


Remedy sought


19) As the request to quash the MacKenzie Creed and to be returned to employment as the only feasible action under the circumstances with all conditions of the contract to apply are so inextricably intertwined, these two requests should not be considered as mutually exclusive. Full salary appropriately compounded  is requested for these ‘lost years’ as this plaintiff was denied the social and pension benefits from those years. An actuarian would be required to work out the actual amounts to which I submit the court should grant 90 days.


20) Whatever other funding that the court should decree.









File number CA030699, made February 27, 2004

(Annotated) Questions:

21) a) How does a conspiracy between a union and an employer in the conduct of an employee’s grievance impact on the collective bargaining scheme? (Particularly when evidence would show that the request to use BILL 35 against me originated within the local West Vancouver Teachers’ Union = ‘sweetheart deal’ in which I submit the Union would sacrifice the teacher if the Employer would sacrifice the Superintendent. He was removed the following year and never held another post in B.C. RWC)


b) Does the Labour Relations Board have exclusive jurisdiction to hear an unfair representation complaint by a union member against a union where the occurrences giving rise to the grievance happened at a time where the relevant category of union members were excluded from the ambit of the Labour Relations Act? (The Justice System glossed over this fact although it is to be noted that the Board repeatedly refused a Section 12 hearing on this matter which would have revealed the conspiracy = the Labour Board joined the conspiracy.)


c) In what circumstances can a court of inherent jurisdiction process a union members grievance in the face of a collective bargaining agreement that provides for arbitration to resolve grievances? (That is the key point in this question of national importance then and now which the SCofC has failed to address ((refusing to hear this case in 2004 and currently filibustering) = Third World status as SCofC becomes part of the conspiracy.This question lies at the center of the current appeals (5 and possibly 2 more to come). The ‘MacKenzie Creed’ complicates the current legal scene to such an extent and degree that now, no matter what the outcome, Canada is reduced to that of ‘a failed state’. No legal system can withstand ‘running a court within a court’and be considered viable.))





22) This is an application for leave to appeal the decision dated January 9,2004, of the the Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissing the Applicant’s appeal from the decision of Mr. Justice Williamson of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Justice Williamson dismissed the Appelant’s action against the Respondents based on conspiracy and ordered that the appellant may not, without leave of the Court, institute any legal proceedings in the Supreme Court of British Columbia. (Note that this provision does not deny court access to me such as is the case of the MacKenzie Creed. S106159, which she removed from the docket, requested such leave making her Order redundant as well as antithetical.)

23) The Appelant, a teacher who had been employed by the Respondent School Board for 17 years, has been endeavoring since his layoff in 1985 to obtain redress for what he believes to be the unlawful action of the Respondent school board.

24) The Respondent Association initially assessed the Appellant’s grievance to be with merit and took it to an unsuccessful arbitration, asnd then to a successful judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision (only after I changed lawyers and an appeal was filed without Union knowledge), where Madam Justice Southin determined the arbitrator’s decision to be flawed, and directed the arbitrator to hold a further hearing. Madam Justice Southin’s decision was upheld at the Court of Appeal. (NB Ontario Teachers would be interested in this point. The Employer argued that BILL 35 was a consentual agreement (between employer and union) as opposed to imposed (by government). While it was a ridiculous argument, the Employer was in a position to blackmail the courts; a blackmail dealt with elsewhere and which exists to the present day.)

25) Before the arbitration could be reconvened the arbitrator died.

26) Section 5 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act did not permit the matter to be referred to an arbitrator other than the arbitrator who heard the matter in the first instance. (‘frustrated’ situation where litigants are not to be held liable for court ‘glitches’.)

27) After the death of the arbitrator, Mr. Lindholm, in November 1989, the Respondent Association abandoned efforts to complete the arbitration and obtain reinstatement for the Appellant. It was willing, however, to pursue settlement negotiations with the School Board to obtain financial compensation. However, the Applicant objected to the compensation strategy, based on wrongful dismissal concepts, as being inadequate and continued to press for a judicial or arbitral determination of the validity of the layoff of an appropriate compensation strategy.

28) The Respondent Association was not certified as the teacher’s bargaining agent until 1988. (why any other B.C. teacher is screwed under the circumstances of a sweetheart deal although the courts continued as though I was under sole Union control...a good reason for never holding union membership…and staying out of a Canadian courtroom unless you first buy the judge.)

29) The history of the Appellant`s efforts through the courts and the Labour Relations Board are detailed in the affidavit of J.S. Clyne and Douglas Player , filed on the motion before Justice Williamson. (Clyne was the ‘go to’ lawyer for School Boards prosecuting teachers but lost that business after this case.)

30) In all of these efforts the Respondent Association and Respondent School Board have adopted virtually identical positions in opposition to the Appellant’s actions. Throughout all of the proceedings both Respondents reminded the court and the Labour Board that the settlement proposal of approximately two years salary was a reasonable one, which cointinued to be available. (If I had accepted that offer, to be sure it would set a precedent for anyone else ‘laid off’ in Canada as opposed to being dismissed under the wrongful dismissal laws which are a different set of laws. This case is all that keeps employers from following the ‘West Vancouver School Board’s “final solution” hence I am fighting for all Canadian employees. SEE 11 c)

31) That settlement proposal is no longer available and the Respondent Association has completely abandoned the Appellant’s grievance.(Smart employers always have ‘an offer of settlement’ on the table as a means of delay by obviating ‘pending’ court actions.


32) The basis of the within action is conspiracy. The Appellantalleges that the Respondent School Board and Respondent Association have conspired to thwart his grievance. The particulars alleged are as follows:

a. refusing to call as witnesses at the arbitration, or on the contemplated recommencement of the arbitration, any of the Board trustees who were at the meetings in 1985 where Mr. Callow’s lay off was discussed, and allegedly decided; (the trustees refused, in essence, to perjure themselves, leaving that to the Superintendent);

b. agreeing to make the Board’s consent to an adjournment conditional on there being no financial prejudice to the Plaintiff; (that’s a big one and possible grounds for the employer to pursue the union should I win my current action);

c. putting forth the “no financial prejudice” agreement as a roadblock to achieving a monetary compensation settlement based on breach of statutorily imposed contract that did not provide for a “right to terminate” (as opposed to settlement based on wrongful dismissal principles where the employer has a right to terminate providing it gives adequate notice or compensation in lieu);

d. refusing to support the Plaintiff’s request for reinstatement via a reconvened arbitration;

e. refusing to pursue the reasonable monetary compensation settlement proposal advocated by the Plaintiff;

f. taking an adversarial position against the Plaintiff during court proceedings commenced by him directed at reinstatement; (the union refused to hand authority over to me to conduct a re-arbitration at my own expense.)

g. abandoning all efforts to negotiate any compensation.


33) Of particular concern to the Appellant is the reticence of the Respondent School Board and Respondent Association to reveal what was discussed at, or to disclose the minutes of, the “lay-off” School Board meetings held prior to or at the time of the Appellant’s layoff in 1985. (Under the ‘access laws’, I received partial information which showed that a vote was taken by the Board regarding the lay-off which appeared in their arbitration record. What did not appear was the vote pattern in which Chairperson Margo Furk and her successor, Mike Smith, were the only two out of five who voted in favour of the lay-off. This is the material which Justice Southin concealed opening her to blackmail.)He alleges that such evidence would have demonstrated that the criteria for lay-off as set out in Bill 35 did not exist. (there was no declining enrolment)As Madam Justice Southin said in her Reasons for Judgment in 1986.

“No minute was adduced in evidence to show that the Board ever in tended to layoff a certain number of teachers under the new statute”. (note the legal casuistry here as Southin skates around the specific action of laying off Callow)




34) Does the conspiracy alleged against the Respondents in the conduct of the grievance process permit the Supreme Court of British Columbia to exercise its inherent jurisdiction?

35) Are the issues raised in this action Res Judicata?

36) Can an unfair representation complaint arising from occurrences which began in 1985 at a time when teachers or their unions were not subject to the Labour Relations Code be pursued in the Supreme Court of British Columbia?






37) The Honourable Mr. Justice Donald has unfairly characterized my action as ‘obviously a vexatious attempt to relitigate matters already settled’. In fact I want no more than any citizen would consider an inherent right in a fee and democratic society: an opportunity to have our justice system determine whether the termination of my 17 year teaching career by the Respondent School Board was performed in accordance with our law. As Mr. Justice Spencer pointed out:

“I observe that even if he was unsatisfactory from the Board’s point of view, he was entitled to be dealt with according to law under the School Act and not to be made the victim of an abuse of authority. Whether he was, remains to be decided and the sole person who could decide it is dead. (Spencer is dead wrong here and knows it as he asked me in court for the applicable rules regarding ‘frustration’; the key point being that litigants are not to be held at a disadvantage due to court ‘glitches’) It is to be hoped that there is some way of addressing that purported wrong”. (but not in his court as he had a choice; either change Southin’s ‘should’ to ‘must’ have employment returned or order the matter back to arbitration; again, a point he raised in court. That ‘limbo’ game has characterized this case for 28 years…and still counting.)

I ask no more and am prepared to accept the consequences of that determination one waqy or the other.


38) I am fully aware of the labour relations institutions that have afforded employees the right to collective bargaining and understand that as a trade off

for that right employees relinquish the ability to directly pursue employment related grievances against an employer. But re

But where, as alleged in this case, the employer and the employee’s union representative conspire to subvert the employee’s grievance, they undermine the very foundations of the collective bargbaining process which presumes a collective employee representative acting in the best interest of its union members independent of employer interests and free from employer influence. If that independence breaks down as alleged in this case, union representation of the employee deteriorates beyond unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith representation, the determination of which in cases where the parties activities are governed by the Labour Relations Act vests with the Labour Relations Board to subversive conduct so anethema to the collective bargaining process as to be considered as no representation at all. In such circumstances courts ought to ensure an appropriate remedy.


39) It is significant to note that the conspiracy referred to above is not that the Association and Employer conspired to bring about my layoff (although they may well have). (they did) Rather, the conspiracy alleged is that the Association and Employer conspired to thwart my grievance. It started with the failure of the Union at the arbitration in 1986 to inquire into the discussions that occurred at the board meetings where my layoff was talked about as in indicated above, and continued as alleged in my Statement of Claim. It continues to this very day with the Association’s and the Board’s refusal to produce the relevant minutes of this meeting and other meetings between the Association and the Board occurring at or about the time of the layoff.


40) The conspiracy does not arise in its essential character out of the layoff or out of the employer/employee relationship. Rather the conspiracy alleged arises out of and goes to the very root of the grievance process itself. The courts jurisdiction is not ousted as the “essential” character test referred to in Weber has not been met.


41) Further, the arbitration with its attendant remedial powers as set out in the statutorily deemed collective bargaining agreement, BILL 35, is no longer available. (Ontario teachers take note) The arbitrator is deceased. The law does not permit the arbitration to be referred to a substituted arbitrator. The residual discretionary power of courts of inherent jurisdiction to ensure the applicant an “ultimate remedy” is thus preserved.

Weber v. Ontario Hydro(1995) 2 S.C.R.929




42) The Court of Appeal refers to a previous action I commenced and the resulting court decision as determinative of the issues raised in the within action.


43) My response is that the facts supporting the within action are quite different from the actual underpinning of the previous action. There are now allegations of conspiracy related to the grievance process. These allegations date back to the beginning of the grievance following my layoff in 1985, and to the subsequent arbitration where no minutes were produced to show that the Board ever intended to layoff any teachers under the new legislation (BILL 35). “No minute was adduced in evidence to show the Board ever intended to layoff a certain number of teachers under the new statute”. The only minutes produced, and the only evidence submitted at the arbitration as to the discussion among board members concerning my layoff were the pro forma minutes likely written by the Board’s lawyers. None of the board members allegedly present at the board meeting where the decision to terminate me was made were called to give evidence. (the key to the arbitration conspiracy as the union lawyer refused to put them on the stand after the employer lawyer’s refusal. I almost – and in retrospect should have – fired him on the spot. An honest arbitrator would have called for that evidence.)


44) The merits of the previous proceeding have been determined. Justice Spencer’s decision was based on his perception that I had no standing and that the court lacked jurisdiction, because of the collective bargaining agreement. More importantly the essential facts in the present action are different from the essential facts of the previous action.


45) The res judicata doctrine does not therefore apply to the merits of the within action. Nor, does the doctrine apply to the current jurisdictional issue as this is the first action brought against both Respondents where grievance process conspiracy has been raised. This is not simply a different theory of liability, it is an entirely different cause of action arising out of different events than have been pleaded in any previous action.




46) Prior to 1988 the Labour Relations Code (then called The Labour Relations Code of British Columbia) specifically excluded teachers from the ambit of that legislation, which, of course, included the provisions governing the Labour Relation Board’s exclusive jurisdiction to hear unfair representation complaints.

Lamont v. British Columbia Teachers Federation (1997) B.C.J. No. 1032 (QL) (B.C. Ct. of Appeal)


47) The occurrences giving rise to the conspiracy allegations in this action commenced as early as 1985.


48) Accordingly, even assuming that the allegations in the within action against the Respondent Association could be characterized as “unfair representation” complaints, the Labour Relations Code

does not prevent the Supreme Court of British Columbia from assuming jurisdiction.

Mills v. London Life Insurance Co. (2000) O.J. No. 1243 (Q.L.) (Ont. S.C.)




49) The correctness of my lay off from my teaching position in West Vancouver in 1985 has never been properly tested. That fact flies in the face of the law and the Chartyer of Rights and Freedoms in Canada and yet over 30 judges up to and including the Supreme Court of Canada has not seen fit to insist that I be provided the key evidence of School Board meeting notes pertaining to the matter of my lay off. To that extent the judicial system is part of the conspiracy charge which I have laid against the Teachers Union and the School Board and yet, due to the nature of the law, can only be referred to obliquely. Should the Supreme Court of Canada proceed on the frivolous and vexatious charge by which I am estopped from being granted a legal hearing without insisting, in this most unusual of cases, for the necessary disclosure of evidence be provided to me; namely the School Board meeting notes of 1985 showing that I was indeed laid off by the West Vancouver School Board in June of 1985, then all Canadian law is at an end. Conversely put, it may be asked, how may I defend a negative which is a logical impossibility; namely, that I was not indeed laid off by the West Vancouver School Board in June of 1985?


50) There are good grounds to conclude that I have been the object of a massive conspiracy to deny me access to the laws. In 1986, Justice Mary Southin, in quashing the arbitration favouring the School Board, had stated that ‘nowhere did the Board express a willingness to lay off a teacher under the new statute’ implying the fraudulency of the School Superintendent’s letter to that effect. From my experience from the condemned arbitration in which no School Board member was called to the stand to explain how an increase of 16 teaching positions – any number of which I was capable of holding - …I am being denied any hearing which would giv e me an opportunity to voice my dissent. Certainly no reference to my lay off was publicly made in the monthly report in June of 1985 where the additions were noted and filed in arbitration. No mention is made of any layoff.


51) Considering that Justice Southin in 1986 ordered that all material pertaining to my layoff be made available to the court and no doubt serves as the basis of her conclusion, then we submit such information would be the property of the Union and therefore should be made available to me even though the court has full control of this matter as far as questioning the matter of my layoff. Both the Union and School Board steadfastly refuse to hand over this vital information. Indeed, it would appear that it was the laying of a conspiracy charge against the two parties which prompted the current frivolous and vexatious charge by which those two have successfully evaded having to produce the vital “missing link” information. The failure of the two Appeal Court decisions of the B.C. Supreme Court to address that concern is at heart of this appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. This appeal also marks the second time that this matter has been brought before the Supreme Court of Canada.


52) Simply put, how can the justice system of Canada in all good conscience deny me access to the court to resolve an unresolved legal matter which even the court has declared should have been re-arbitrated. The fact that the original arbitrator passed away under a law which would not see the appointment of any other arbitrator calls into play the courts role of inherent jurisdiction in order to finalize this case. Failure to do so up to and including one appeal already to the Supreme Court of Canada is a denial of the letter and spirit of the law in Canada.