QUOTE: 'Wow, a judge who's going to be impartial and fair. Imagine that.'

                   The Reversal  Michael Connelly




1a) In this 30 year unresolved  B.C. labour issue relating to an alleged illicit lay-off of former senior West Vancouver, B.C. teacher, Roger Callow, in June of 1985 under the conditions of the neophyte BILL 35, it is easy to lose sight of the above basic fact; the most recent Decision on February  by Vancouver Prothonotary, Roger Lafrenieré  (L.) notwithstanding. SEE his Order included here Vol. I  pp.10-14

1b) The Decision of L. is particularly disturbing as he should not have heard this case for two reasons:

a) He was the sitting prothonotary in a previous aspect of this case in Federal Court (T-1386-11) hence he should have recused himself from this appointment. Chief Justice Rt. Hon. P. Crampton was the Chief Justice in both incidences and laterally was kept apprised of Federal Court irregularities in this matter by me. It is submitted here that the ongoing accusation of fraud against courts in B.C., the Federal Court, and Ontario courts have impaired this applicant from achieving a legal Decision which is his right in law. Without that legal decision, no compensation (includes pension rights) may flow.

b) As in the first hearing of T-1386-11, L. appeared to 'jump the gun' in T-2360-14 by holding a hearing in which this plaintiff was not notified.  It is clear from materials supplied to the court in Ottawa of which L. was obviously not cognizant  that his Decision in T-2360-14 is bereft of a knowledge of the basic facts whether through design or otherwise. This matter was specifically designed by this plaintiff to have been held before a judge in Ottawa under the mediation provisions of the Federal Court. Appointing a prothonotary increases the Appeal procedure by another level for which I hold Chief Justice Crampton accountable as he was kept fully informed of earlier  L. peccadilloes. SEE 'APPLICATION OF FEDERAL COURT RULES' in rebuttal of L. Decision February 17-2015 now marked Vol. 1 pp 15-28 N.B. this account also possesses  extended information relating to this claim in a previous Federal Court request taken by Madame Justice Gleason and ensuing events as this issue was re-entered in Ontario. It also includes information from the B.C. courts. The date of the original entry in Federal Court was November 14,2014.


2) For the above reasons, I ask the court to quash the L. Decision of February 11-2015 considering him to be 'patently unreasonable' for reasons noted above and also detailed in the following account. This matter should be remitted to the original intention of this appellant/ plaintiff  to make use of the written arbitration procedures offered by the Federal Court under Rule 258.4. That form is included here.


3) The above brief synopsis is why this Appellant  has lost all confidence in receiving just treatment before the Federal Court of Canada and why he has asked the Prime Minister's Office for a review officer to follow this case.  The following  definitions of the application of Federal Court Rules along with Charter Rights and Freedoms  are appended as noted above which apply to this case although a reader would not know of that application  from a reading of L's February 11-2015 Decision.




4) L. completely ignores the fraudulent complaints against the court processes including his earlier performance in T-1386-11.


5) The so-called 'material facts' in this 'bald allegation of fraud' which L. claims are unsubstantiated (similar to his earlier ruling in T-1386-11) by this appellant is clearly false as a number of submissions were in the process of being admitted to the court in Ottawa. Either he did not know of these documents included here or he does not read his legal mail.  Hence his quoting of Rule 181(1) in that regard has no meaning.


6) We are in trickier ground with L.'s jurisdictional definition regarding fraud. "In particular, the Plaintiff's claim does not rely on the breach of any federal law." A review of the Rules of Law do not include such terminology as the court has never, it would appear, been challenged on this level which is why Parliament, if it were to do its job, could challenge this matter under such as the peace, order and good government clause, or the notwithstanding clause. Currently this Appellant is at the mercy of a capricious Parliament unwilling to face this major challenge. Further, The frivolous and vexatious Order filed in Ontario by Superior Court Justice, Colin McKinnon (13-59060) where this writer was the Respondent did, as the transcript notes illustrate, had both this writer and Justice McKinnon agreeing that only the Supreme Court of Canada (SCofC) is so organized to handle this topic of fraud as it relates to the judicial process; particularly as the SCofC failed on two earlier occasions in  1997 and 2004 to hear any appeal ('Universality of unions' and 'ultimate remedy'). The problem, as I outlined in the transcript, is how to get it before that court (for a third time) when they have refused this appellant on a number of applications under Section 40 as the SCofC only hears appeals from three judges of the highest court of a jurisdiction. SEE Vol. II Tab 7 p.32


7) In many ways, the Hollinrake Decision of  January 17,1997 (pp. 432-436) is central to the case in B.C. quoting, as it does, extensively from the case I launched against the Board (no Union present) for abandonment of this issue in that the Board did not return to litigation as so order by the court in 1997 when they failed to return employment to this teacher as recommended by the court. Unfortunately, the court had not ordered this writer back onto salary as per contract provisions or, to be sure, we would not be here today. Justice Spencer (1995) 8 B.C.L.R. (3d) 186


8) Hollinrake: Vol. III Tab 7 pp.432-435 (6) As I see it the real problem here is the dispute between Mr. Callow and the West Vancouver Teachers' Association'...Mr. Callow will not agree to anything other than that this matter be concluded through the courts and outside the labour relations scheme under that Act.  (7) As I said before , I am of the opinion that Mr. Justice Spencer was correct in finding on the facts as he did that Mr. Callow has no standing before the courts in this case. In concluding as I have I wish to record that I am mindful (my underlining) of the concept of the courts having a residual jurisdiction as found in the judgment of Madam Justice McLachlin in B.M.W.E. v. Canadian Pacific (1996) 136 D.L.R. (4th) 289 at 292 (s.c.c.)


9) Spencer had placed all his eggs in one basket to avoid making a decision; namely, to affix for a first time, the application of the Labour Code when neither of the litigants - the teacher and the employer - were asking for same. He had a choice; either return employment to this appellant  as requested (change the should of Justice Southin's 1986 Decision to must return employment) or re-order a stagnant arbitration. He chose neither believing that this comment would resolve the matter: Vol. III TAB 9 p.435 Spencer: It follows, in my opinion, that the petitioner is bound by any settlement of his dispute reached by the Association. Nothing transpired although there was copious letters on this side of the issue between Laughton for the Union and Ottawa lawyer, Paul Conlin, for the teacher. SEE ibid Tab 6


10) The Union must have been only too painfully aware that if they had signed an outside agreement with the Employer without my consent, then a suit against them would quote an Employer letter claiming that under the conditions of the imposed School Amendment Act (1985) 'BILL 35' used only against this teacher before it was rescinded in the 1990's; the Collective Bargaining Rules were not applicable hence the Union was operating under false pretenses whether wittingly or otherwise. Vol. III Tab 9 p. 299-300 Letter from Employer Feb. 7,1996


11) The above is the significance for my request to obtain the 'secret memo notes' (Justice Southin called for all meeting notes from the Employer and the Union on the issue of Callow's lay-off but later returned them 'because she did not use them'. The submission here is that her action set in train a course of blackmail by the Respondents as the court was now complicit in this fraud. That is seen to the present day, including the recent L. Decision, as a massive cover-up has been conducted through a means of systematical judicial abuse on a scale unknown in the annals of Canadian Jurisprudence (nor possibly anywhere else in a democracy.) Those memo notes, therefore, which L. certainly was not willing to call for, are at the heart of the fraud dealing with both the original conspirators and the courts. The application under Rule 18 is included here

12) L. also ignores the 'constitutional question' (if he was even aware of it). CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - FEDERAL COURT  T-2360-14  SEE Vol III 'A' in Index (A 1 0f 2)

(2) Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that any law (BILL 35-R.C. notation) that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution of Canada - the supreme law of the land -is, to the extent of its inconsistency, of no force or effect. A tribunal must respect the Constitution so that if it finds invalid a law (BILL 35 and 'current demonstrated ability' undefined in the statute or in law generally although for structural reasons, it may not refer to teacher competence.R.C.) it is called on to apply, it is bound to treat it as having no force or effect. Weber vs Ontario Hydro  Dominion Law Reports 125 D.L.R. (4th) p.594


13) Of further interest here is the status of internet material which the Employer introduced without complaint from the court, in order to bolster their 'frivolous and vexatious charge'. Use of the internet is a grey area in law. However, considering the Employer's action in choosing selections from my web site: employeescasecanada.com,  I have taken the liberty of providing all pertinent materials to this case from this site as those newsletters reveal aspects of the legalities of this case which do not fit neatly into the rules of the court. Unless the Respondents insist on pursuing this 'litigious and vexatious' angle (which is the only argument launched by them); then I will omit these newsletters from this current account.


14) Perhaps the most egregious action of all by L. is reflected in this statement: `Being substantially in agreement with the written representations filed on behalf of the WVTA (West Vancouver Teachers Association), which I adopt and make mine....` The sole argument set forth by the Union (with Employer agreement) was to quote at length from the Ontario C. McKinnon j. Order #13-59060 where the Employer (the Union was never present in these Ontario hearings) asked for a discussion of all issues concluding with the claim that they were not going to pay compensation  in a 29 year old case. I was the Respondent in that case where I was treated as the Appellant. They didn't get that bid.  What the judge did do was to provide a rather inaccurate background definition of 'frivolous and vexatious' requirements as defined by court resources which I never saw until I read the judgment as a means of impairing my other bids before the court. McKinnon later exacerbated his actions in collusion with a second judge, Robert Scott (#15-59607) which has led to a complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council. They are not responding. Further, the Employer lost their Ottawa counsel after that caper. Again, I will not include my detailed response to the 'frivolous and vexatious' before Scott j. given in a subsequent court unless the Respondents pursue this ill-advised course In brief, it is submitted that the Defendants could ill-afford to counter my actions on fraud by responding to my claims thus revealing the perfidy of justice Southin and the 'secret memo notes' hence this was nothing more than a mechanism to deflect the charges of fraud bought into with alacrity by L. Hence there is strong argument that  the 'frivolous and vexatious' charge by McKinnon j. was brought in with no relation to the charges of fraud currently before the Federal Court although the transcripts show discussion on this level. If anything, McKinnon j. believed - as I do - that this topic is more properly a matter for the Supreme Court of Canada leaving the lower courts to be little more than 'speed bumps' in that process.


15) All in all, the L. Decision of February 11-2015 is one of the weakest dissimulations which I have received in the 30 years of this ongoing saga. Considering that the Chief Justice of the Federal Court and the PMO were kept fully informed of unfolding events in T-2360-14, Canadians have every right to be frightened of the future for our democratic society which, I submit, is currently functioning on the level of a 'banana republic' due to the machinations in this national case.


16 ) It is hoped that the Federal Court can get matters back on track by:

a) permitting an Ottawa judge to give a preliminary written evaluation of these materials (as earlier requested) after quashing L.'s Decision of February 11-2015.

b) acquire the 'secret memo notes' of B.C.'s Justice Southin (1986)

c) evaluate the 'status question'

d) consider the constitutional question

e) consider the question of fraud on the two levels outlined in the above material


Your truly,


Roger Callow   March 9, 2015  (re-submission)


N.B. As much of the material entered in the February 09-2015 submission is germane here; much attention has been paid to trying to keep the material intact with moderations made to form in order to conform more closely comply with Federal Court rules.


cc SCofC Hon. R. Wagner

     Canadian Judicial Council

     PMO (no copy this time to Fed. Court  Chief Justice P. Crampton)