February 28-2017  (REVISED)


TO: Chief Justice  David Jenkins                                     FROM:

       PEI Supreme Court SIGS                                           Roger Callow   self-represented plaintiff

       42 Water St, Charlottetown,                                   1285 Cahill Dr. E. #2001

       PEI  C1A 1A4                                                                 Ottawa, ON K1V 9A7    

       tel: 902-368-6067 fax: 902-368-0266                fax: 613-521-1739


SENT BY FAX  2  pages


QUOTE: 1) If the bad guys are wearing white hats while they break the rules ...you throw the rules out the window. The Bone Tree  Greg Isles

2) annotated quote 'If our parents (judges) lie to us - not merely by omission, as all do, but by commission - then how can we ever know ourselves (our society)?  Ibid


REFERENCE:  It would seem that events once again outrace my resubmissions to the PEI court due to court procrastination.  My offer to work with prothonotary Terry MacPherson has not led to any phone call on that basis such as is the case in other provinces. I  ask her to contact me ASAP by telephone if this new resubmission still requires adjustment.  Again, I keep Premier MacLauchlan fully apprised of events in this national issue.

web site: employescasecanada.ca



1) This unresolved legal matter regarding the 'illicit' lay-off of former West Vancouver, B.C. high school teacher, Roger Callow, under the auspices of the imposed BILL 35 in June of 1985 is fraught with fraudulent actions by both the conspirators and the courts (over 12 separate court systems with over 50 judges including 4 inconsequential trips to the Supreme Court of Canada-SCofC). No compensation has been paid which belongs to this plaintiff whether it be under BILL 35 (which only the Employer recognizes as having legal weight), the collective bargaining agreement (which only the B.C. courts will recognize) or general terms of contract.


2) In terms of court focus, the four inconsequential trips to the SCofC ARE pertinent here:

a) 1997 - B. McLachlin sat on this panel along with Chief Justice A. Lamers plus Cory j. on the universality of unions question. If the court had heard the case, we would not be here today.

b) 2004 - This hearing focused on the ultimate remedy aspect of this case in which 'no legal answer became a legal answer' = anarchy.

c) 2016 - two rejected SCofC cases - QC 36883 & SK 36993 - by the same panel of three judges.

    (i) Both hearings grew out of fraudulent actions in Ontario relating to the 'bobbsey twins'                        Ottawa Superior Court Justices, Colin Mackinnon 13-59060 and Robert Scott 14-61592; both originally Federal Court appointees (Canadian Judicial Council oversight presided over by Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin).  There has never been any response.


3) In bottom line language, the Justice System of Canada believes that dealing in technicalities apart from issues passes for Justice. That's why the executive powers of the PMO have been called into play; P.M. Trudeau being the first 21st century P.M. so challenged and is MIA.



4) Any province so challenged with any part of this issue is understandably alarmed as this case threatens the very underpinnings of the credibility of that province selected. Rarely do I get co-operation in setting the case as usually the Registry is improperly used to obfuscate the matter to avoid a hearing. Ultimately I do get a docket number for to reject my case without a proper judgment of the court is to deny the very basis of habeas corpus. The continual rejection of PEI, therefore, must not stand if PEI is to retain any judicial credibility. In brief, the government of Premier W. MacLauchlan is on trial on this point.


5) Due to the delay, events have outraced the original Action filed by me so that a revised factum is now being presented against (with?) the B.C. Union. As to the original request solely for the purpose of acquiring disclosure, I hold that part in abeyance as long as the Union does not file a defense argument against the constitutional question. If they so choose to file an argument opposing my action, they should expect to bear the full brunt of a $20 million action for fraud against them.


6) The question now being asked is limited to the 'case-neutral' constitutional question regarding the national importance of how the government relates to the courts i.e. What is the relationship of imposed legislation to the oversight powers of the judicial system?


7) In the 11 day arbitration in B.C. in 1985, the Union limited themselves to a half hour segment noting that the neophyte BILL 35 was 'in addition to' the Schools Act and did not in any way supplant provisions of said Act. The court in quashing the arbitration favouring the School Board ruling, as they did, that the arbitrator to be patently unreasonable, recommended that employment be returned to this senior teacher as BILL 35 was devoted to economic considerations. (The arbitrator converted 16 new hires to read  16 lay-offs with Callow to be the necessary 17th knowing full-well that Callow was the only lay-off in June of 1985.) In the event that the Union does file a response, PEI should only recognize PEI legal counsel as they are bound by the PEI legal code.


8) This matter should be conducted in writing through court Referencing with both litigants available for additional input.


9) In the event that the PEI courts believe that B.C. would be a more appropriate venue, the PEI court must over-rule the 'Cullen Creed' of July, 2013 which

expelled this writer from the B.C. Justice System for 'reasons best known to a judge' on an action called on his own recognizance, unsupported by any law and with no legal argument taken. Nor were any laws quoted in his aberrant Order. In short this highly specious action is ultra vires but no court outside of B.C. - and there have been many-  will make any reference to this judicial debacle.


10) Failure to register this case will lead to a direct request to P.M. Trudeau to assign a trusteeship over PEI courts until the court processes are properly followed in this case.


Yours truly  Roger Callow self-represented plaintiff


encl. new factum limited to the constitutional question (to court/defendant Union / Attorney Generals - Canada /PEI    / P.M. Trudeau   /RCMP)





                                                                             (Court file no.)_____________





BETWEEN:                                                                                      ROGER CALLOW










APPLICATION UNDER (statutory provision or rule under which the application is made) RULE 14A and CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - Referencing (1) b RULE 54.02 (1) b and  RULE 4.11 Section 49 Judicature Act FORM 4F



49. (1) Where a constitutional question is raised in a proceeding in a

court as to the constitutional validity or constitutional applicability of an

Act of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or of a regulation or

bylaw made there under, the Act, regulation or bylaw shall not be

adjudged to be invalid or inapplicable unless notice of the constitutional

question has been served, in accordance with subsection (2), on the

Attorney General of Canada and the Minister of Justice and Public Safety

and Attorney General of Prince Edward Island.



Exhibits                                                                                                      PAGES

A) NOTICE OF APPLICATION - Constitutional Question                                       01      

B) INDEX                                                                                                                              02

C) AFFIDAVIT  FORM  4D                                                                                                03 - 04

D) STATEMENT OF CLAIM  FORM 14A                                                                       05 - 07

E) NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION  FORM  4F                                       08 - 09

F) ARGUMENT - BACKGROUND                                                                                   10 - 16

G)         "              - DEEP BACKGROUND                                                             17 - 20

H) Following Documentary Evidence

    (I)  Paul Conlin esq. vs B.C. Labour Board                                                 21 - 24

    (II) Preamble to the Supreme Court of Canada 2004                                        25 - 27

    (III) Charter of Rights & Freedoms excerpts  August 04-2015                      27 - 31

    (IV) The 'Cullen Creed' & Reply  July 2013                                                            32 - 34

    (V) 'Gaming the System'                                                                                             35 - 38

I) Newspaper Clippings  September 1986                                                                39 - 40

J) AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE ( Registered Mail Receipt to WVTA             

    included in to Court Copy)                                                                                         41


Signature (Roger Callow)_________________________  February 28-2017                                                                                                                                                      






Roger Callow

1285 Cahill Drive E. #2001

Ottawa, Ontario K1V 9A7

tel/fax: 613-521-1739

e-mail: the callows@gmail.com    Applicant (self represented)




West Vancouver Teachers Association (Local #45)

ATTN: Robert Millard - President

4915 Marine Drive

West Vancouver, B.C. V7W 2P5

tel: 604-926-1617  fax: 604-926-1119   Respondent


AFFIDAVIT attesting to validity of documents herein enclosed


I, (full name of deponent) of  Roger Callow in the Province of Ontario (Ottawa)


1. That the material in this factum signed by the Plaintiff dated February 28, 2017 is an accurate account of the material facts included.



I, Roger Callow of the City of Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, swear and affirm the following is true:

1. I turned 65 on August 24, 2006, which brought into play my pension rights;

2. My pension rights are determined on the basis of contributions to the plan, both mine and the employers;

3. The amount of these contributions is dependent on the date of termination of my employment;

4. Because I was a tenured teacher, my employment could only be determined by a proper legal process;

5. In my case the validity of the termination has never been determined. Technically although I was unable to work and was not paid, I remained a teacher under the employment of the Board;

6.I require that a proper termination date be determined, or a settlement be achieved providing me compensation which would include pensionable service benefits;

7. The recent pension inquiries caused me to examine how I could get compensation or a termination date determined. There is no other remedy I can pursue other than as requested in this petition.

8. Whatever approach is made, disclosure as outlined above is at the root of any successful remedy although that is not asked  in this petition.


______________________(signed) Roger Callow - Applicant  FEBRUARY 28-2017













(4.05.1) Originating Process

Roger Callow

1285 Cahill Drive E. #2001

Ottawa, Ontario K1V 9A7

tel/fax: 613-521-1739

e-mail: the callows@gmail.com    Applicant  (self represented)


West Vancouver Teachers Association (Local #45)

ATTN: Robert Millard - President

4915 Marine Drive

West Vancouver, B.C. V7W 2P5

tel: 604-926-1617  fax: 604-926-1119   Respondent




(Court seal)







plaintiff. The claim made against you is set out solely as a constitutional question


IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, you or a lawyer acting for you must prepare a statement of defence in Form 18A prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, serve it on the plaintiff, and file it, with proof of service, in this court office, WITHIN FORTY DAYS (total) after this statement of claim is served on you, and filing your statement of defence in FORM 18B  prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.


IF YOU FAIL TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, JUDGMENT MAY BE GIVEN AGAINST YOU IN YOUR ABSENCE AND WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE TO YOU. N.B. It is recommended that  you do NOT oppose this constitutional question as it is the exact same one that you raised in arbitration in 1985; namely, that the neophyte B.C. BILL 35 was in addition  to the collective bargaining (c.b.) scheme and therefore did not supplant any part of the c.b.. The arbitrator ignored that submission but it was the focal point of the succeeding B.C. Supreme Court hearing before Justice Mary Southin whom quashed the arbitration favouring the Employer ruling, as she did, that the arbitrator had been patently unreasonable. In brief, the Union and this Applicant are on the same side of this constitutional question.



West Vancouver Teachers Association (Local #45)

ATTN: Robert Millard - President

4915 Marine Drive

West Vancouver, B.C. V7W 2P5

tel: 604-926-1617  fax: 604-926-1119   Respondent



1. The plaintiff claims:

As no compensation has been paid by the Employer in this June 1985 lay-off of senior West Vancouver senior teacher, Roger Callow,(includes pension rights for the past 10 years) due to the refusal of the Board of School Trustees (S.D. #45) to acknowledge Judicial overview claiming that solely BILL 35 is the applicable rule of law, then a judicial finding must first be made regarding the relationship between imposed legislation and the courts of law. While it is not the province of this court to adjudicate specific compensation claims, it should be aware that this Applicant claims that compensation is due whether it be under under BILL 35, the collective bargaining agreement, or some other measure under contract law.


(State here the precise relief claimed.)

A ruling limited to the constitutional question: 'Does the court have oversight powers to imposed government legislation where that legislation 'is in addition to' any other statute?


(Then set out in separate, consecutively numbered paragraphs each allegation of material fact relied on to substantiate the claim.)



(Where the statement of claim is to be served outside Prince Edward Island without a court order, set out the facts and the specific provisions of Rule 17 relied on in support of such service.)

The 'Cullen Creed' (enclosed here) of July-2013 in which Appeal Court Deputy C.J. ,Justice A. Cullen expelled the applicant from B.C. courts on his own recognizance, without taking legal argument nor quoting applicable laws, and for 'reasons best known to himself' forced this applicant into venues outside of B.C. To date, no court will deal with this obviously ultra vires action. Should a court refer this matter to the B.C. courts as a more suitable forum for this question, it will have to consider the details of the above Creed. The constitutional question, in this regard is of national concern; the Employees Case (Canada) merely being the legalistic vehicle for expressing this challenge.


2.The plaintiff proposes that this action be tried at Charlottetown,P.E.I.

(Date of issue)______________

Roger Callow

1285 Cahill Drive E. #2001 Ottawa,

Ontario K1V 9A7  tel/fax: 613-521-1739

e-mail: the callows@gmail.com    Applicant (self represented)


_______________________________ (signed) Roger Callow February 28-2017






(General heading)


Roger Callow

1285 Cahill Drive E. #2001

Ottawa, Ontario K1V 9A7

tel/fax: 613-521-1739

e-mail: the callows@gmail.com    Applicant  (self represented)


West Vancouver Teachers Association (Local #45)

ATTN: Robert Millard - President

4915 Marine Drive

West Vancouver, B.C. V7W 2P5

tel: 604-926-1617  fax: 604-926-1119   Respondent




The Applicant intends to question the constitutional validity (or applicability) of (identify the particular provisions of the relationship between imposed legislation and the oversight powers of the court) in an action (or motion, application appeal or as may be) to be heard on (day), (date), at (time), at (address of courthouse).


Sir Louis Davies Law Courts SIGS

GeneralCivil Proceedings

PO Box 2000 42 Water Street

Charlottestown, PE  C1A 7N8

tel: (902)368-6001  fax: (902) 368-0266




The following are the material facts giving rise to the constitutional question: (Set out concisely the material facts that relate to the constitutional question. Where appropriate, attach pleadings or reasons for decision.) SEE F) & G) BACKGROUND

The following is the legal basis for the constitutional question: (Set out concisely the legal basis for each question, identifying the nature of the constitutional principles to be argued.)


(Date) February 28, 2017

(Name, address and telephone number of  party)

Roger Callow

1285 Cahill Drive E. #2001

Ottawa, Ontario K1V 9A7

tel/fax: 613-521-1739

Applicant  (self represented)


(signed) Roger Callow  Applicant  February 28-2017





(Names and addresses of solicitors

for all other parties and of all

other parties acting in person)

(This notice must be served at least thirty days before the question is to be argued


1)TO The Attorney General of PE Island       2)The Attorney General of Canada

Department of Justice and Public Safety                Atlantic Regional Office                                             
Department of Justice Canada                                 
Fourth Floor, Shaw Building, South 
95 Rochford Street                                                    
Suite 1400, Duke Tower
P.O. Box 2000                                                                       
5251 Duke Street
Charlottetown, PEI                                                    
Halifax, Nova Scotia
C1A 7N8                                                                    B3J 1P3                                                                      

Deputy Minister  Erin Mitchell.                                Telephone:  902-426-3260
Telephone: (902) 368-5152                                        

Facsimile: (902) 368-4910                                          Fax:  902-426-7913

3) SEE above for WVTA specifics  4) SEE above for Applicant specifics





1) I, Roger Callow, assert that in regarding my senior teacher lay-off for economic reasons in 1985 under the conditions of BILL 35, compensation is due whether it is under the terms of BILL 35, the collective bargaining arrangement or some other form of contract related to labour matters. No compensation (includes pension rights) has been paid.


2) The position of the Employer, the Board of School Trustees S.D. #45 (West Vancouver, B.C.) is that court overview of the quashed arbitration with regards to the lay-off of senior teacher Roger Callow in June of 1985 under BILL 35 is not valid as the BILL and the arbitration is the only legitimate decision.


3) This precedent-setting case has an unusual history rooted in a B.C. labour case where senior West Vancouver teacher, Roger Callow, was laid-off under the neophyte imposed legislation of B.C.'s BILL 35 in June of 1985.


4) The subsequent arbitration favouring the School Board was quashed by the courts with the gerrymandered government arbitrator ruled as being patently unreasonable.


5) No compensation has been paid leaving this employee in a perpetual state of limbo in contradiction of the most basic tenets of the law.


6) The Employer appealed Justice Mary Southin's Order but was defeated. Regrettably she did not point out obvious fraud which would have ensured court jurisdiction. No mention is made in either of these two judgments (plus Appeal) as to the Employer's assertion that only BILL 35 applies to this case obviating court overview.


7) The following 30 years has seen a litany of unsuccessful actions laid by this plaintiff designed to produce disclosure (or habeas corpus) for the purpose of establishing fraud. That disclosure consists of the minute notes of the School Trustees in June of 1985 where BILL 35 and the Callow matter were discussed at length.


8) This factum makes a different Appeal limited to the constitutional question at the heart of this dismissal which has application across Canada for employees and employers alike. For example, SK Premier Brad Wall is ironically treated with the same contumely under imposed legislation in the carbon tax which his courts would visit on me in the SK version of this case later rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCofC) for a hearing (36993-2016).


9) The basis for this appeal by the plaintiff employee is limited to the constitutional question in which the Employer only accepts the arbitration hearing to be valid while this plaintiff claims that whether it is under BILL 35 conditions, collective bargaining terms or some other legal scheme, compensation must be paid.


10) It is important to stress what this factum does not ask for as added material is provided only as periphery background to this issue.

a) It does not ask for the court to assign a monetary value as the outcome of this enquiry should suffice for the litigants to arrange an out of court settlement based on this court's finding on the constitutional question. Should further litigation be required, action could be taken in B.C. based on the PEI precedent to displace any prohibitory B.C. court ruling (Cullen Creed).


b) It does not ask the court for a finding as to the ultra vires action of the Cullen Creed (2013) nor BILL 35 (SCofC 36993 SK) which this plaintiff claims they are but should the court choose under the rules of transference to direct this matter to B.C. courts, a direct indictment of the 'Cullen Creed' which forced this case into courts outside of B.C. is first required.


c) It does not ask the court for a finding as to fraud which permeates hearings in many other courts which, due to the failure of oversight bodies, now rests in the executive powers of the Office of the Prime Minister.


11) As the Union and this employee are in basic agreement with the constitutional question to be asked, it is unlikely the Union will even bother filing a case as long as the court limits the hearing to the constitutional question. The Employer launched a similar constitutional challenge to 'hear all issues' in Ontario (13-59060 McKinnon j. Decision April 23-2014) which was marred by a second Decision on September 15 which made no mention of the first Order. As the Respondent I was in complete agreement with the question which, regrettably, Justice McKinnon failed to address. Every oral hearing, and there have been many, has been marked by a judicial system which evades the issues presented under highly specious circumstances.


12) In reviewing the plethora of material by the Employer in many court filings, conspicuous by its absence is the Judgment by Southin j and the Appeal by Taggart/Hinkson/Anderson which is included here under the Exhibits.

N.B. Nowhere is there any evidence that the Employer questioned the jurisdiction of the court not to have oversight capabilities. It would appear that fiction is a central part of the cover-up.


13) It goes without saying that, similar to other provinces, the Premier, PEI teachers , will be kept fully apprised of this case. The legal services of B.C.'s Laughton & Co. for the above mentioned reasons should not be recognized in PEI.


14) Legislation in issue The legislation asserted to be unconstitutional is BILL 35 (B.C.  1985)

The legislation may be, but not likely, constitutional; but it requires interpretation vis a vis government-courts of law relationship which is the sole purpose of laying this case in PEI.

(One direct challenge to the constitutionality of BILL 35 regarding the undefined term 'current demonstrated ability' in either the statute or law in general was snuffed out when the Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear this matter in 2016 (36993 SK).


15) Reason for assertion The grounds for asserting the legislation is unconstitutional are as follows:

To place it in the vernacular of the Union's legal representative: 'BILL 35 was the Roger Callow Act'. In brief, the B.C. Legislature was hi-jacked and the judiciary co-opted to sanction a 'sweetheart deal' between Employer and Union in order to fire a whistle blower (I presented the Ministry of Education in Victoria, B.C. in 1985 with evidence of fraud on the part of an administrator responsible for my professional Report.) ('Imposed' B.C. BILL 35 used only against this individual teacher before it was withdrawn in the 1990's before this case was resolved = banana republic justice)


16) The 'fraud' aspect for which I have unsuccessfully called the RCMP for action is well known but without the necessary disclosure, the matter will not stand up in court. It is submitted here that two former WV Union presidents and friends of Principal, John Williams, where we all taught (only in 1984-5 for me) at West Vancouver Secondary School (Williams was a former teacher in the school), approached Superintendent Ed Carlin to invoke the neophyte BILL 35 (effective July 01-1985; lay-off letter June 26-1985) after I had mailed damaging information regarding a key alteration in my professional teacher's Report to Deputy Minister, Jim Carter; himself the former principal at WV Secondary and chum of Williams. Carter was no stranger to controversy himself with the firing of a senior teacher in 1978 under dubious conditions. Carlin was the Superintendent at that time as well. He departed the WV District in 1986 never to serve in the public education field again.


17) The scheme was to use BILL 35 to circumvent the collective bargaining process so that I would have to foot the bill for the arbitration which, as a young father, I could ill afford; but that was the point. That way, my whistle blowing could be buried with no action taken against Williams whom went into a quiet retirement five years later.


18) Considering that the central Union, the BCTF, called on all teachers to challenge this imposed legislation (similar to Nova Scotia in November of 2016), they could ill-afford not to finance the arbitration although administrators were part of the Union (until 1988). By failing to place the School Trustees on the stand by either the Board or the Union to testify to lay-off numbers i.e. to risk perjury, no doubt convinced the arbitrator that he was - not incorrectly - looking at a sweetheart deal and, therefore, would not have his decision challenged.


19) I changed lawyers and successfully appealed before Justice Southin. The Union latterly offered to pay for that appeal. Unfortunately, the replacement legal firm which I fired and therefore lacked the necessary authority to represent my interests (Bruce Laughton QC whom insists that representing the Employer against my interests is ethical behaviour after representing both sides. He still represents the Union.), chose to illegally represent me in the Appeal unsuccessfuly launched by the Employer. No mention is made in either of Southin's judgment or the Appeal Court as to the Employer's contention that BILL 35 does not permit of court oversight. In brief, that appears to be an argument latterly developed by the School Board in order to create confusion from which they could avoid any compensation which is mine under BILL 35 conditions or the collective bargaining terms or some other contractual arrangement. That is the sole purpose of the PEI case; to establish the relationship of the courts to imposed legislation under the aegis of Premier MacLauchlan.  All PEI as well as the rest of Canada is affected by this national question.


20)  (1)  The facile arguments raised by the Respondent Employer since July 2013 in courts outside of B.C. by the West Vancouver School Trustees S.D. #45 against former senior teacher, Roger Callow, laid-off in June of 1985 under the neophyte conditions of BILL 35 (effective July 01-1985) and where no compensation has been paid are reduced to three central arguments (quoted from SK action QBG 1902/15):


a. This honourable Court lacks any jurisdiction to hear and decide the Applicant's claims or to grant the relief he is seeking;

b. The matters raised in this application are precluded from being heard under the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppal and abuse of process; and

c. The matters raised in this application are vexatious and beyond all applicable limitation periods.


(2) REBUTTAL by the Plaintiff Employee to the above:

a. The jurisdictional dispute falls flat when one considers that it was the 'Cullen Creed' of July 2013 which expelled the plaintiff from B.C. in an unresolved labour matter where no compensation has been paid contrary to the imposed BILL 35, the collective bargaining rules (if applicable) or any other labour statute regarding compensation. (This Creed is referred to as 'issue estoppal' in b.) The word 'facile' is used as no court - and there were many outside B.C. - would rule directly on the obvious ultra vires nature of an action which was passed by a B.C. judge on his own action, without taking legal argument, without quoting pertinent laws, and for 'reasons best known to himself' in an unresolved legal action. Nor would any court refer the matter back to B.C. for resolution taking  a parochial stand best summed up as 'not our department'. Finally, the payment of compensation in labour matters is a central tenet in law for all provinces and this case serves as a very dangerous precedent as governments can void court oversight for both employers as well as employees with imposed legislation if this arbitration decision is permitted to stand.

b. res judicata refers to 'matters already settled' according to the Employer. Their argument here is that BILL 35 accepts the arbitration finding in favour of the School Board as final and binding rejecting, in that process, the court and Appeal Court actions of quashing the arbitration ruling, in that process, the government appointed arbitrator to be patently unreasonable. In 1995 in an action launched by this plaintiff, B.C. Supreme Court Justice Spencer ruled this matter to be a Union action to be resolved under the collective bargaining rules which all subsequent B.C. Courts supported. The Employer does not recognize the collective bargaining rules. While the Union may act according to the legitimacy of the lay-off, their authority does not extend to compensation which has not been paid no matter which scheme is selected for the purpose. Here is where all courts have fallen down badly including the Supreme Court of Canada and why this case now rests in the  executive powers of a future Prime Minister considering Justin Trudeau remains inactive on this vital question affecting the welfare of all employees in Canada. As to 'abuse of process'; that term is being used as a catch-all for many items.


c. If there are limitation periods on compensation, the Employer never quotes any. Further if the Employer in this 30 year bid for disclosure or habeas corpus which is the basis of all law had provided the information requested- or alternatively, the court had ordered these minutes of the School Board for June of 1985 where BILL 35 and the Callow case were extensively discussed - then in all likelihood a charge of fraud would be laid. There is no limitation on charges of fraud. These matters are hardly 'frivolous and vexatious'


(3) Constitutional Question: Does 'imposed' government legislation  obviate court overview when such legislation makes no reference to replacing parts or all of particular statute laws. i.e. that the imposed legislation is 'in addition to'. In this case the School Amendment Act (BILL 35) has produced contradictory results in this case if the Respondent Employer's interpretation above is to be accepted. It is to be noted, in that regard, that compensation is operant in all forms of the Act noted above and exists apart from these legal machinations.  The Employer raised this question in their action about issue constitutionality in Ontario (13-59060 Colin McKinnon j. April 23-2014 Decision which he completely ignored). The plaintiff here is now raising the same question. The only change is the reversal of the Plaintiff-Respondent relationship which has no significance to the issue raised.




21) With the approval of the court, it would appear the nature of this constitutional question requires 'Referencing' by which a specialist could be called on to write the decision thus obviating the troublesome oral hearings plaguing this case, largely, it is submitted here, by interference through the office of the Chief Justice.


22) With a judicial decision on the constitutional question, the hope is that the plaintiff and defendant can reach an outside settlement and barring that, the plaintiff may re-enter the B.C. courts on the grounds that a judicial decision elsewhere obviates any prohibitory measure ('Cullen Creed') against this applicant.



(signed) Roger Callow  self-represented plaintiff   


________________________  February 28, 2017





1) The WV School Trustees refused to recognize court oversight which quashed the arbitration in 1986 favouring the School Board ruling, as it did - and was supported on Appeal - that the arbitrator had been patently unreasonable.  According to the Trustees the collective bargaining rules including the Union had no application to this case. The arbitrator's decision under BILL 35 was final and binding.(A similar stunt was enacted by the CBC in their dismissal of employee Jian Ghomeshi  'for no given reason' thus obviating the Union's role and the collective bargaining rules although the Union financed his case as happened here. The question in both cases is whether the Union action is 'gratuitous' or under the collective bargaining rules.) No mention is made in either court of the Employer's contention that the court had no overview powers.)


2) It should be noted here that while fraud was apparent, Justice Mary Southin in 1986 and the Appeal court in 1997 fell short of declaring the matter fraudulent thus ensuring court oversight. That is the point of demanding disclosure although that feature has been postponed in this submission for the meeting notes of the School Trustees in June of 1985 where there was extensive discussion of BILL 35 and the Callow matter. Southin j. called for these memo notes which she later returned 'because she did not use them'. Thus began the biggest cover-up in Canadian Judicial history.


3) For 30 years court challenges were made including this current submission for the Union's copy of disclosure by this plaintiff before over 50 judges including the Supreme Court of Canada (SCofC) which refused to hear this highly contentious case on four occasions: a) 1997 - 'universality of unions'  b) 2004 'ultimate remedy'  c) 2016 - two actions: disclosure QC and ultra vires nature of BILL 35 SK. The last two matters now rest in the hands of the executive powers of a future Prime Minister as it is apparent that the anti-employee Justin Trudeau would ignore his responsibilities in this legal matter.


4) The 2004 SCofC was the most significant rejection as while there is some debate about whether the Union controls the matter of the propriety of the dismissal (of which control the School Trustees would reject), there is no question that no matter which scheme is followed, this plaintiff may pursue the Board directly for compensation as even BILL 35 includes that feature.


5) In 1995, this plaintiff returned to B.C. Supreme court before Justice Spencer requesting that he change the should of Justice Southin to must return employment with all of the contractual  terms to apply due to the Employer's failure to return to arbitration as so ordered by the court in 1986. In brief, the Employer had abandoned the claim.(In law a judicial recommendation carries weight.) His choice was clear; either to grant my petition or, as he proposed,  send the matter back to arbitration. Spencer j. did neither. No Union was present at this hearing.


6) Justice Spencer created an error of commission which was quoted chapter and verse by every succeeding B.C. Justice hearing this case; namely, that this was a Union matter and, as such, could be contested only by the Union. No doubt he was painfully aware that this plaintiff was faced with a sweetheart deal in which the Union undermined the arbitration of this plaintiff by failing to place the School Trustees on the stand to testify to lay-off figures which showed an actual increase rather than decrease in teacher enrolment; any number of positions which Callow was qualified to hold.


7) I had earlier replaced the Union arbitration lawyer with the arbitration loss when it was clear that the Union had no intention of appealing. Harry Rankin (d.) and his junior acolyte, Bruce Laughton, promised that in any re-arbitration as so ordered by the court, School Trustees would be placed on the stand to testify as to lay-off numbers which the earlier Union lawyer had refused to do.


8) When Rankin & Co. later reneged on that promise noted above, I dismissed his Company and  hired labour specialist, Leo McGrady, whom sought to have a new arbitrator assigned if the court were reluctant to order the return of employment to Callow. He did not succeed on either point.


9) In the interim, unfortunately, the Union in terms of Bruce Laughton whom I had earlier dismissed, presented himself representing my position before the B.C. Appeal Court. Mr. Laughton, contrary to good ethical legal behaviour, told me that he now solely represented the Union, a position he maintains to the current day much to my chagrin and personal suffering. The point here is that he had no standing in that Appeal Court to represent my position.


10) That latter point is important as it appears that Mr. Laughton had no standing before the Appeal Court as Union jurisdiction had not been discussed until 1995. Further, if I had had control of the Appeal, I would be in possession of the disclosure in 1986 and there would be no need for this current case in P.E.I.


11) In the latter 1990's, armed with the Spencer decision, Mr. Laughton informed me that the Union was going to make a settlement with the Employer whether I agreed or not 'under the best terms available'.


12) In that settlement process, my Ottawa lawyer, Paul Conlin, wrote him an alternative strategy which Laughton had not considered.


13) Immediately, Laughton reversed his position and stated that the Union would not settle without first acquiring my support for the proposed settlement leaving me essentially in a state of permanent limbo if I disagreed. As Mr. Conlin asserted, the effect of Laughton's position was that I could disagree if I wanted to, but then I would get no settlement; an unconscionable  position as it reduced my protest to  mere tokenism.


14) Conlin replied that the Union had either to return to arbitration as so ordered by the court or sign an agreement with the Board, whether I agreed or not. In the event of the failure to do either, the matter (including disclosure) should be turned over to Callow for his offer to continue legal action at his own expense. There was no response.


15)The Union knew that if they unilaterally signed with the Board that the Board would no longer be liable to future claims so that if I subsequently successfully sued the Union for fraud, the whole conspiracy would come out leaving the Union to be solely responsible for 90% of the claim which now reached past the million dollar mark.


16) The only legal recourse now open to Callow was a Section 12 Appeal to the B.C. Labour Board which refused such a hearing on more than one occasion considering that the Union 'had done nothing wrong' which invites the question 'did they do anything right?' A letter from the Employer dated Feb. 07-1996 to the Labour Board appears to have intimidated the Labour Board into not holding an oral meeting by stating that the Employer strenuously rejected Labour Board jurisdiction on the grounds that only the conditions of BILL 35 applied as the Employer continued to 'game the system'. Thus the cover-up initiated by Justice Southin was compounded by Laughton's appearance in the B.C. Appeal Court, which was added to by the deviousness of Justice Spencer and the B.C. Labour Board. Over 50 judges to date have committed to that conspiracy. Will P.E.I. add their name to that ill-omened list?


17) Subsequent to Labour Board inaction, all B.C. courts ducked their responsibilities until in July of 2013, Deputy Associate Supreme Court Justice, A. Cullen (Cullen Creed), expelled this plaintiff from B.C. Courts 'for reasons best known to himself' in this unresolved legal matter leaving me on a kafkaesque search for justice in courts outside of B.C., including now, P.E.I.


18) As the Union joined with the Employer in opposing me in B.C. courts, I  divested myself of naming them in court cases outside of B.C. with the exception of P.E.I..



19) As a Union member, I believe that I must have access to all legal material held by the Union which affects my personal welfare. If the court has a conscience - something certainly lacking regarding actions against the Employer to date - it will order the B.C. Teachers Union to produce that disclosure. Any excuse to obviate that request will undermine the course of justice in Canada as court inaction on this request would be a de facto judicial acceptance of the sweetheart deal and thus the demise of the Union movement in the entire country of Canada. It goes without saying that such a court denial would leave P.E.I. firmly in the hands of the conspirators.







     The nub of part one of the Petitioner's complaint before the B.C. Labour Relations Board ("the Board") was that the Association failed to provide a fully considered response to his request that the Association review, deliberate upon, and assess the merits of his proposed alternative settlement strategy. The factual assertions underlying this part of his complaint are set out in paragraphs 16 through 21 of the Petitioner's outline. The assertions are particularly germane are as follows:

(a) The Association through Mr. Yorke (see letter of February 24, 1997) promised to "carefully consider (Mr. Callow's) views concerning settlement";

(b) The Association  had not previously (i.e. before the Petitioner's request of July 14, 1997) considered the alternative strategy;

(c) Mr. Laughton provided a "preliminary view" of the strategy only. His preliminary response was given without knowledge of any legal support for the strategy, and with a promise to "revisit" the issue on receipt of such authority;

(d) The Association (M. Laughton) never indicated one way or the other, after being advised of the legal foundation of the strategy, whether the strategy might have merit despite three written requests from the Petitioner's counsel.


     While the Board accepted (with hesitation) that the Association had an obligation to respond to the Petitioner's request "in a manner that accorded with its duty of fair representation", it did not accept the Petitioner's factual assertions underlying the complaint as it was required to do in making a S.13 determination. Rather the Board found "there is no evidence from which it could be inferred that Laughton did not review, or failed to be persuaded by, the Philip (SIC) authority either arbitrarily or for reasons attributable to bad faith..." There clearly was evidence (or factual assertions) as indicated in (a) (b) (c) & (d) above from which it could be inferred that no full consideration of the strategy in light of the legal authorities ever occurred, and that, if it did, the results were not communicated to the Petitioner. In either case arbitrariness or bad faith must be implied to Mr. Laughton. The only evidence that Mr. Laughton did review the strategy was his initial response (Laughton letter of October 2,1997) given with an admitted lack of knowledge of the legal basis for the strategy. It is patently unreasonable to interpret that response as satisfying the Association's duty to respond (a duty which the Board found to exist) without arbitrariness or bad faith.


     Having thus denied the Petitioner's factual underpinnings and having determined, without jurisdiction, that the Association did provide a meaningful response, the Board went on to conclude that the "response" was reasonable.


     In doing so, because there was no Association response to the legal foundational elaboration of the strategy as set out in Conlin's (Plaintiff's legal counsel) letter of October 2, 1997, the Board had to review Mr. Laughton's "preliminary view" following his cursory introduction to the strategy (see Laughton letter of September 22, 1997). Here also the Board, misinterpreted or failed to accept the factual assertions of the Petitioner. The Board interpreted the Petitioner's factual position as being that the success of the alternate strategy rested on either a judicial/arbitral finding of liability, or an admission of liability. The Board's reasoning appears to be that since the Association had a right not to pursue arbitration (which the Board concluded was the only means of determining liability) and since the School Board was not likely to admit liability, the Association's refusal to pursue the alternative strategy was reasonable.


     The Labour Board based its finding that the Association had a right not to pursue arbitration on its own determination of the issues in the Petitioner's first complaint. The Board's decision on the first complaint is under judicial review but no date for a hearing has yet been set. The Board's conclusion  that its decision had been confirmed by the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal is therefore erroneous, both in relation to the procedural (timeliness) issue, and in relation to the merits of whether the Association had a right not to pursue arbitration.


    If the Board, when referring to Court confirmation of the Association's right not to pursue arbitration, was alluding to the decisions of the B.C. Supreme Court and Court of Appeal in proceedings initiated by the Petitioner not involving the Board, it was mistaken as to any such confirmation. All such decisions by either the Supreme Court of B.C. or the Court of Appeal involved other issues and were decided on the basis that the Petitioner, as a member of a collective bargaining unit, had no status to pursue his claims. Far from determining that the Association had a right not to pursue arbitration or that arbitration was precluded, Mr. Justice Spencer (1995) suggested a method of getting arbitration on the rails. Further, because the circumstances giving rise to the Petitioner's lay-off grievance predated the Association's certification and the mandatory applicability of the Labour Relations Code to the Petitioner's complaint, it is open to the Petitioner to have the unsolved issue of the merits of his first complaint determined in Court, quite apart from the judicial review of the Board's untimeliness decision on that complaint.


     The Board's error in finding that the Association's action in refusing to pursue the alternative strategy was reasonable goes beyond the Board's mistaken premise that the Association had a right not to pursue arbitration in aid of reinstatement. It compounded its error by extending its approval of the Association's decision not to pursue arbitration in aid of reinstatement to the Association's decision not to pursue arbitration in aid of compensation. It did so even though in finding that the second complaint was timely, it carefully distinguished the actions of the Association in pursuing reinstatement on the one hand, and financial settlement on the other (see paragraph 31 of  decision). It correctly found that the two remedies were independent of each other. Similarly the means of achieving those remedies ought also to have been viewed independently.


     The conclusion therefore reached by the Board that the Association acted reasonably in deciding not to pursue the alternative strategy was based on a faulty premise, namely, that the Association had a right not to pursue arbitration and, by extension, that the Association was under no obligation to have liability determined under any circumstances. To say that it is reasonable to be unwilling to determine liability or an unreasonable position on compensation for Mr. Callow, no matter which strategy is pursued, is either futile or entirely dependent on the benevolence of the School Board. The Board's conclusion is therefore patently unreasonable. Parenthetically, the School Board has failed to demonstrate any such benevolence. In fact in negotiations with the Association it initially denied Mr. Callow's right to any interest on any compensation that might be agreed to, and later offered a partial payment only of court order interest. That offer was subsequently withdrawn. Both the School Board and the Association seem more intent on immediate collection of legal costs awarded against Mr. Callow as a result of his effort to achieve fair compensation than they are in providing fair compensation to him.




1) If you can get through the legalspeak, compensation depends on the legitimacy of the lay-off of Mr. Callow in June of 1985. To date there is no decision (arbitration quashed) leaving him in limbo for 30 years; a preposterous position for any litigant. No compensation  has been paid.

2) Any such enquiry held by the Labour Board or courts would have forced disclosure and the fact that Justice Southin covered-up a conspiracy of massive proportions in 1986.

3) It would also permit an Employer to argue that under BILL 35 conditions, the courts and Union under the collective bargaining rules had no jurisdiction in this matter and why they claim they owe no compensation in this matter as the Arbitrator's Report is the final word; not that of the court.

3) The SCofC in 1997 compounded that cover-up by refusing to hear this matter under the 'universality of unions'  thus compromising the entire Union movement.

4) The SCofC in 2004 refused to hear this matter under 'ultimate remedy' hence 'no legal answer became a legal answer' That reduced Canada to Third World status.

5) In 2016, in the SCofC appeal 36883 of QC failure to produce 'disclosure' on June 09-2016 decimates the entire justice system as all written law becomes redundant. That's anarchy.

6) Whom runs Canada? SCofC Chief Justice B. McLachlin or Prime Minister Justin Trudeau?


(II)                                                                       Preamble to Supreme Court of Canada Appeal

(This Appeal denied in June/04 – explains why the Canadian Justice System imploded) 

This preamble makes an unusual request regarding habeas corpus 

     The correctness of the lay-off of teacher Roger Callow from his teaching position in West Vancouver in 1985 has never been properly tested. That fact flies in the face of the law and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of Canada and yet over 30 judges up to and including the Supreme Court of Canada has not seen fit to insist that Mr. Callow be provided the key evidence of School Board meeting notes pertaining to the matter of his lay-off. To that extent, the judicial system is a part of the conspiracy charge which Mr. Callow has laid against the Teachers Union and the School Board and yet, due to the nature of the law, can only be referred to obliquely. Should the Supreme Court of Canada proceed on the frivolous and vexatious charge by which Mr. Callow is estopped from being granted a legal hearing without insisting, in this most unusual of cases, for the necessary disclosure of evidence to be provided to him; namely, the School Board meeting notes of 1985, then all Canadian law is at an end. Conversely put, it may be asked, how may Mr. Callow defend a negative which is a logical impossibility; namely, that he was not indeed laid off by the West Vancouver School Board in June of 1985? 

     There are good grounds to conclude that Mr. Callow has been the object of a massive conspiracy to deny him access to the laws. In 1986, Justice Mary Southin, in quashing the arbitration favouring the School Board claiming, as she did, that the arbitrator had been patently unreasonable in his conclusion favouring the School Board, had stated that ‘nowhere did the Board express a willingness to lay off a teacher under the new statute’ implying the fraudulency of the School Superintendent’s letter to that effect. Mr. Callow from his experience from the condemned arbitration in which no School Board member was called to the stand to explain how an increase of 16 teaching positions – any number of which Mr. Callow was capable of holding – submits that, while knowing otherwise, he is being denied any hearing which would give him an opportunity to voice his dissent. Certainly no such reference to the lay-off was publicly made in the monthly report in June of 1985 where the additions were noted in arbitration. No mention is made of any lay-off. 

     Considering that Justice Southin in 1986 ordered that all material pertaining to the lay-off of Mr. Callow be made available to the court and no doubt serves as the basis of her conclusion, then we submit such information would be the property of the Union and therefore should be made available to Mr. Callow even though the court has decreed that the Union has full control of this matter as far as questioning the matter of his lay-off. Both the Union and School Board steadfastly refuse to hand over this vital information. Indeed, it would appear that it was the laying of a conspiracy charge against the two parties which prompted the current frivolous and vexatious charge by which those two have successfully evaded having to produce the vital ‘missing link’ information. The failure of the two Appeal Court decisions of the B.C. Supreme Court to address that concern is at the heart of this appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 

     Simply put, how can the justice system of Canada in all good conscience deny Mr. Callow access to the court to resolve an unresolved legal matter which even the court has declared should have been re-arbitrated. The fact that the original arbitrator passed away under a law which would not see the appointment of any other arbitrator calls into play the courts role of inherent jurisdiction in order to finalize this case. Failure to do so up to and including one appeal already to the Supreme Court of Canada is a denial of the letter and spirit of the law in Canada.

"The curse of the world is not decisions taken, Blake reflected, it's the decisions shelved, bought off, sidestepped."   War Dance Tim Sebastian

It is dangerous to be right when the government is wrong. Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1919-2000) '...Every government must accept responsibility for the rights of the citizens within its own jurisdiction. Canada as a whole suffers when any of her citizens is denied his rights, for that injustice places the rights of all of us in jeopardy.




(III)                                                                                                                 AUGUST 4-2015

From Quebec QBG 1902/15 comes the following on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Technically, SK's Megaw j. did not have the following document for his purview but I do not excuse him on that account as both the Respondent and the Plaintiff were willing to continue this case on a written party by party basis. If Megaw j. had initiated this process before making an Order, many of the concerns voiced here could have been addressed if I had known the direction in which he was headed. The charge here is one of 'lack of due diligence'.



     Assuming QC Justice Dominique Goulet jcw is acting properly with his interference in Gatineau Court's #550-1700-8208-157 (H.D. June 08-2015) -  and the assertion to the QC Judicial Council is that he isn't - he has asked the wrong question which should have referred to my reason for being in a QC Court in a case with its genesis in B.C. under the headings of natural justice and inherent jurisdiction: I would have responded accordingly:

1) natural justice: In common parlance, a judge may not pick up the 'judicial ball' and go home without first making a court finding so that a litigant(s) is not left in limbo. (Without that court finding; my compensation -including pension rights- is held up...for 30 years and counting.) The oft-quoted Justice Estey (St. Anne Nackawick) is germane here: 'What must be avoided at all costs is a fundamental deprivation of justice under the law.' That is what is happening here.


2) inherent jurisdiction: A trickier proposition as all provinces are understandably reluctant to deal with matters having their genesis elsewhere. The point here is that the 'Cullen Creed' (July 23-2013) expelled me from the B.C. Justice System for 'reasons best known to the judge' as Deputy Justice A. Cullen acted on his own recognizance; did not take legal argument; and did not quote specific laws. Without including the all-important 'may only proceed with permission of a judge, Cullen j. radically changed a basic tenet of law in this unresolved legal matter. The following excerpt from the Charter would have been my response which now appears to be slated for an Appeal Court hearing if I have second-guessed the courtroom judge, Therrien j. correctly. Unfortunately, he didn't ask any questions on June 8-2015 reflective of a pre-ordained judgment based on 'air' as the Employer appeared bent on throwing their case for unknown reasons thus prompting Goulet's j. interference providing them with a 'second kick at the can'. Running a court within a court is a judicial no-no.



One of the most notable effects of the adoption of the Charter was to greatly expand the scope of judicial review, because the Charter is more explicit with respect to the guarantee of rights and the role of judges in enforcing them than was the Bill of Rights. The courts, when confronted with violations of Charter rights, have struck down unconstitutional federal and provincial statutes and regulations or parts of statutes and regulations, as they did when Canadian case law was primarily concerned with resolving issues of federalism. The Charter, however, granted new powers to the courts to enforce remedies that are more creative and to exclude more evidence in trials. These powers are greater than what was typical under the common law and under a system of government that, influenced by Canada's mother country the United Kingdom, was based upon Parliamentary supremacy. As a result, the Charter has attracted both broad support from a majority of the Canadian electorate and criticisms by opponents of increased judicial power. The Charter only applies to government laws and actions (including the laws and actions of federal, provincial, and municipal governments and public school boards), and sometimes to the common law, not to private activity

Equality rights:

Section 15: equal treatment before and under the law, and equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination.


The notwithstanding clause authorizes governments to temporarily override the rights and freedoms in sections 2 and 7–15 for up to five years, subject to renewal


Interpretation and enforcement

The task of interpreting and enforcing the Charter falls to the courts, with the Supreme Court of Canada being the ultimate authority on the matter.

With the Charter's supremacy confirmed by section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the courts continued their practice of striking down unconstitutional statutes or parts of statutes as they had with earlier case law regarding federalism


In general, courts have embraced a purposive interpretation of Charter rights...

This is tied to the generous interpretation of rights, as the purpose of the Charter provisions is assumed to be to increase rights and freedoms of people in a variety of circumstances, at the expense of the government powers.


The only values mentioned by the Charter's preamble are recognition for the supremacy of God and the rule of law,


Most importantly, from a lawyer's perspective, is the fact that the principle of stare decisis does not apply to tribunals. In other words, a tribunal adjudicator could legally make a decision that differs from a past decision, on the same subject and issues, delivered by the highest court in the land. Because a tribunal is not bound by legal precedent, established by itself or by a reviewing court, a tribunal is not a court even though it performs an important adjudicative function and contributes to the development of law like a court would do.

Although stare decisis does not apply to tribunals, their adjudicators will likely nonetheless find a prior court decision on a similar subject to be highly persuasive and will likely follow the courts in order to ensure consistency in the law and to prevent the embarrassment of having their decisions overturned by the courts. The same is true for past decisions of the tribunal.

Among the federal tribunals, there is a small group of tribunals whose decisions must be appealed directly to the Federal Court of Appeal rather than to the Federal Court Trial Division. These so-called "super tribunals" are listed in Subsection 28(1) of the Federal Court Act (R.S.C. 1985, Chapter F-7) and some examples include the National Energy Board, Canadian International Trade Tribunal, the Competition Tribunal, the Canada Industrial Relations Board (i.e. federal labour board), the Copyright Board, and the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission ("CRTC").

Courts of inherent jurisdiction

The superior courts from the provinces and territories are courts of inherent jurisdiction, which means that the jurisdiction of the superior courts is more than just what is conferred by statute. Following the principles of English common law, because the superior courts derive their authority from the Constitution, they can hear any matter unless there is a federal or provincial statute that says otherwise or that gives exclusive jurisdiction to some other court or tribunal. The doctrine of inherent jurisdiction gives superior courts greater freedom than statutory courts to be flexible and creative in the delivering of legal remedies and relief.

     This whole matter of fraud comes down to a revelation of the 'missing memo notes' and the failure of the various courts, now including SK, to further the course of justice by demanding the revelation of those vital documents without which 30 years of legal action and Judicial Decisions have no meaning.

    It is now imperative that the RCMP seize the 'missing memo notes' from the respective lawyers holding them.


cc Governor General D. Johnston / 'Incoming' Justice Minister

SCofC Hon. R. Brown

QUEBEC: D. Goulet j. / Premier Couillard / RCMP

SASKATCHEWAN: Chief Justice M. Popescul / Premier Wall / Regina Leader-Post

FEDERAL COURT Chief Justice P. Crampton

CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL (Hon. B. McLachlin President - never replies)



(IV)                                          Document received from Hon. Associate Chief Justice Austin Cullen dated July 23-2013:


Docket S106159 (Vancouver Registry)

Between:  Roger Callow (Plaintiff)

And: The Board of School Trustees of School District No.45 and West Vancouver Teachers Association (Defendants)



THIS COURT, on its own motion and without a hearing, at Vancouver, British Columbia on Tuesday, July, 23, 2013, ORDERS AND DECLARES THAT: 1. Roger Callow shall not initiate any proceedings or seek leave to initiate in any Registry of the Supreme Court pertaining to or in any way connected with the subject matter of the proceedings in the Supreme Court of British Columbia Vancouver Registry File Nos. S08728, S075775, S022978, A950147, or pertaining to or connected with the subject matter of his allegations against the Defendants in this action or arising from or related to that subject matter.

2. Any document or process filed by Roger Callow in contravention of this Order or any process inadvertently filed or received by the Registry is a nullity to which the Defendants will not be obliged to respond.



1) How is the above Order different from the (undocumented) Order of Associate Chief Justice Anne MacKenzie dated October 1, 2010? There are key differences as outlined in CA038538 contesting her Order which the B.C. Registry rejected for reasons best known to itself.

2) Why is this Order and accompanying letter from a second Associate Chief Justice rather than from Chief Justice Robert Baumann of the B.C. Supreme Court?

3) Number 1. is much the same as the earlier order with this clear addition: …or arising from or related to that subject matter.’

4) It would appear in some disingenuous way or other that Cullen’s Order would seek to obliterate any recognition of the challenge to the  MacKenzie Creed’ as seen in the Appeal Court (Supreme Court) of B.C., the Federal Court of Canada, The Superior Court of Ontario (Ottawa) currently under Appeal in the Divisional Court, and entries pending to the Supreme Court of Canada.

5) Justice Cullen, in the above regard, has not only perverted the course of justice in the B.C. Supreme Court, he has usurped the course of Justice in Canada as his Order well exceeds his authority.

6) CA038538 supplants the earlier Orders listed by Cullen and hence his Order is redundant in that regard.

7) How can Cullen expel this plaintiff from an incomplete judicial action which the courts at one time ordered back to further adjudication in line with the legal precept that ‘there can be no process without judgment’. The oft quoted Justice Estey in St. Anne Nackawic pinpoints this difficulty: ‘What must be avoided at all costs is a fundamental deprivation of justice under the law’. That aberration is what Cullen would sanction in what I submit is ‘patently unreasonable’.  Of course his Order is structured so that no such appeal may be conducted.

8) What if, at some future date, the Union decides to pursue this case? In an accompanying letter, Cullen adds, ‘No further proceedings arising out of or pertaining to the 1985 termination of your employment with the West Vancouver School District will be permitted to be brought in this Court.

9) For unexplained reasons, Cullen would seek to finalize any future proceedings as the phrase ‘with permission of the court’ (MacKenzie Creed) has been eliminated without a proper hearing. My constitutional rights have been abrogated by this Cullen Order in this unresolved labour case where no compensation (includes pension rights) has been paid.

10) ‘Your prior application before Justice Smith for leave to commence a further proceeding was characterized as futile and vexatious and resulted in an order for special costs being made against you.’ Who wrote this? (The Employer?) Who is Justice Smith? Do you mean Justice Maranger of Ontario Superior Court #12-54944 Nov. 1-2012 whose Decision is under Appeal in

Divisional Court(Ottawa)? That Account was settled for the going rate of 1/6 the Employer’s request which was labeled as being exorbitant by Maranger. Including those facts, it needs no doubt to be noted, would undermine the salacious appeal of your line.

11) The notion that the onus is on this party to show that court actions have been ‘patently unreasonable’ through the judicial review process is exactly what CA08538 was all about but was denied filing by the Vancouver Supreme Court Registry. Why have judges under these circumstances to do anything?

12) ‘You must accept the finality of this outcome’. (Cullen) Does that mean the Minister of Justice, Peter MacKay, must accept your statement?

13) Without media coverage, it would seem that the Judicial System of Canada is getting away with the hoax of the century much to the detriment of Canada and 34 million Canadians.

Yours truly, Roger Callow aka ‘The Outlawed Canadian’ www.employescasecanada.ca

cc B.C. Attorney General Suzanne Anton

     SCofC Hon. R. Wagner



(V)                                                              GAMING THE SYSTEM employescasecanada.ca


1) 'That's only her opinion' sniffed West Vancouver School Trustee, Margo Furk, regarding B.C. Supreme Court's Justice Mary Southin's action of quashing the 1985 arbitration favouring the School Board ruling, as she did, the arbitrator to be patently unreasonable. He had converted 16 new hires to read 16 lay-offs  with senior high school teacher, Roger Callow, being the necessary 17th knowing full well that Callow was the only lay-off victim in June of 1985. She fell short of labeling this matter a fraud of which it most assuredly was. 30 years of trying to get those June Board meeting notes (disclosure or habeas corpus) has met with stiff resistance from over 12 separate court systems and over 50 judges in this massive government conspiracy without equal in any democracy. She maintained that the Employer had failed to draw a 'causal connection'.


2) The Board's position at both the Southin j. Decision and the subsequent failed Appeal had been that the Court had no jurisdiction over the imposed BILL 35 so the School Trustees felt justified in ignoring the courts; a position they have maintained up to the present time. No compensation has ever been paid which flies in the face of any number of laws and is the bedrock of the law of labour contracts.


3) As the courts failed to label this matter 'fraud' thereby guaranteeing court oversight, this targeted writer has been kept in a state of perpetual limbo which has led to the demise of the Canadian Justice System. That's anarchy.


4) In an act of misfeasance plaguing our justice system in general and this case in particular, no mention is made of the Board's constitutional position in the above hearings.


5) In 1995, without the presence of the Union, I returned to court before B.C. Supreme Court's Justice Spencer against the Employer requesting that Justice Southin's 'should' return employment (in law, a judicial recommendation has weight) to 'must' due to the apparent abandonment of the renewed arbitration so ordered by Southin j. The only alternative that Spencer j. had was to order the matter back to arbitration. He did neither.


6) While lamenting that I should not be left in limbo, he took actions designed to do just that. He declared this matter a union matter (for a first time), declaring that only the Union could pursue any action on my behalf, knowing full well that I was faced with a 'sweetheart deal'. No one was arguing the point of union jurisdiction in court in this act of judicial misfeasance. In brief, he robbed me of court access with only reference to an ethically challenged Labour Board whom refused a hearing on the grounds that 'the union had done nothing wrong' which does not answer the question as to 'whether they had done anything right'. The letter below, in an act of misfeasance by the Employer, appears to have successfully intimidated the Labour Board into not holding a hearing as I requested. Spencer, in another act of misfeasance paralleled by the original courts in 1985-87 made no mention of the constitutional question on which the Board's case depended.


7) The root cause of the demise of the Canadian Justice System lies with the Supreme Court of Canada (SCofC). In 1997, under the question of 'the universality of unions', the SCofC ducked the issue outlined above greatly compromising the value of holding union membership by anyone in Canada. Included on that panel sat SCofC Chief Justice A. Lamers d. (presence of a Chief Justice denotes a 'political trial') and Beverley McLachlin - the incumbent Chief Justice slated for retirement in 2017.


8) Under McLachlin as Chief Justice in 2004 in a second rejected SCofC Appeal for a hearing, the question related to 'ultimate remedy' in which money (or compensation) must change hands in labour matters. Canada was reduced to Third World status with this gross abuse of contract provisions.


9) In 2013, a now terrified B.C. Justice System in an act of malfeasance, expelled me from the Justice System of B.C. for 'reasons best known to a judge' (The Cullen Creed) in this unresolved legal matter setting me on a kafkaesque journey through the courts of other provinces amid much fraudulent activity.


10) President McLachlin of the Canadian Judicial Council has never acknowledged any of the very serious actions of fraud made by me in these other provinces that I made prompting this protest PLACARD: IMPEACH SCofC CHIEF JUSTICE B. MCLACHLIN. Those fraudulent actions were enunciated in two SCofC Appeals in 2016 which were denied a hearing.


11) The final blow to the efficacy of the SCofC came in 2016 when two filed appeals were refused (36883 QC) and 36993 SK) leaving only a 21st century Canadian Prime Minister with his executive powers to address the single most important question of the 21st century; namely, the fractured credibility of the Canadian Justice System for without credibility, a country is a hollow shell be it democratic or otherwise. Read below for an example as to how the Employer is gaming the system in conjunction with corrupt and corruptible judicial organizations.


The Outlawed Canadian in an outlaw Justice System due to systematic judicial malfeasance.





February 7, 1996  


Labour Relations Board

1125 Howe Street

Vancouver, B.C. V6Z 2K8

Attention: Margaret Arthur

Dear Sirs and Mesdames:


Re: Callow v. The Board of School Trustees of School District No. 45 (West Vancouver) et al

BCCA No. CA020560


We are counsel for the Board of School Trustees of School District No. 45 (West Vancouver) in the above-noted matter.

We note from Mr. Callow's Complaint (p.3(t)) that he seeks from the Labour Relations Board a direction that the Association "take the necessary action to continue the arbitration within the parameters of the 1988 Court of Appeal decision."


It is the School Board's strongly held view that the Labour Relations Board has no jurisdiction to make any ruling regarding the hearing of a future arbitration hearing due to the fact that the arbitration was not a proceeding under the scheme provided in the Labour Relations Code, the former Industrial Relations Act, or the former Labour Code. Indeed, the arbitration in question was a hearing pursuant to the provisions of the School Amendment Act, 1985 (BILL 35 - RC), which the Labour Relations Board has no jurisdiction  to interpret or apply.


We request that the School Board be provided with an opportunity to make further submissions on this point prior to any granting of any remedy.


Yours very truly,

Judith C. Anderson



N.B. The B.C. Labour Board refused all my requests for a hearing as did successive B.C. Courts. The Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear this matter hence the jurisdiction question is at the core of this imposed government legislation. That is how I was relegated to a permanent state of limbo where no compensation (includes pension) was paid in defiance of the rules of labour contract. No Canadian media nor Parliamentary source will publish this ugly truth reducing Canada to Third World status.


    The West Vancouver school board should reinstate dismissed teacher Roger Callow in light of a B.C. Supreme Court decision earlier this week, B.C. Teachers Federation president Elsie McMurphy said Thursday...McMurphy said the teachers' federation is pleased with the decision, as it should discourage school boards from using the legislation in a way it was not intended to be used. She said it was encouraging that Justice Southin stressed teachers' rights to due process if they are to be terminated...She said she doesn't like the idea of sending it back to the arbitrator, because it would be difficult for him to admit he's wrong. He (Callow) should be simply reinstated by the board....


1) The failure of the Union to place the School District 'into dispute' was a signal to the authorities that the Union did not want any investigation of my charges of fraud against an administrator (until 1988, administrators were part of the Union). My return would have forced that issue.

2) There were a number of attempts by other School Boards to use BILL 35 which the Union talked out of leaving the case in West Vancouver to proceed under highly dubious circumstances.

3) The matter did not go back to arbitration due to the intractability of both the Union and Employer in this squeeze play leaving me in limbo in this unresolved labour case. The B.C. courts (Spencer j. Decision 1995) decided that I had no status under these conditions to gain compensation (deferred salary plus pension rights- for 30 years as it turns out). The 'Cullen Creed' expelled me from B.C. in July of 2013 forcing me into other court systems which have fallen on their sword in order to derail this case. All of Canada is poorer for these judicial machinations.

4) The Union had no intention of proceeding to court to appeal the arbitration. It was my change of lawyers which prompted a 'delayed' support; much like the CBC's Jian Ghomeshi case.


...' West Vancouver taxpayers will happily pay whatever cost is necessary to ensure the teachers standing in front of their children have current demonstrated ability,' chairman Mike Smith said after the board voted this week to take the matter to the B.C. Court of Appeal....

But Smith said the board is going ahead with an appeal, which he estimated could cost at least $10,000. (they lost RC) "because we believe the judge erred. (my italics) According to BILL 35, the decision of the arbitrator is binding. There is no right of appeal. (There is if fraud is shown. That is the importance of disclosure of the School Board meeting notes of June 1985.)

     In her ruling, the judge said: "There was evidence upon which the arbitrator could reasonably have concluded the board used the act to rid itself of a troublesome pedant. Mr. Callow ...has been a thorn in the side of the West Vancouver school board." (euphemism for 'whistleblower')


5) 'current demonstrated ability' is undefined in BILL 35 and in law in general but may not be used to refer to teacher competence as BILL 35 was in addition to and did not cancel out any of the provisions of the collective bargaining process. The current SCofC #36993 seeks to challenge the ultra vires nature of this BILL 35 making the lay-off into a nullity.

6) This basic challenge between 'imposed' government legislation and the jurisdiction of the courts (the SCofC challenge #36993 SK ) is at the heart of the smooth operation of our democracy. Failure first by the B.C. Labour Board in 1996 and then the SCofC in 1997 to hold an open enquiry established the nature of the cover-up which extends to the present day in 2016. That failure has led to the decimation of the Justice System in 10 separate court systems and over 40 judges. On June 9,2016, the SCofC is to act on the Quebec excesses (#36883) in this case. Failure once again - there have been two SCofC failures to date (1997 & 2004) - would be 'strike 3' for the Justice System forcing the Prime Minister to take executive action.





I, Roger Callow (Appellant), of 1285 Cahill Drive E. #2001 Ottawa, Ontario K1V 9A7 AFFIRM:


I served the West Vancouver Teachers Association with the Notice of Action  enclosed by sending a copy by REGISTERED MAIL on FEBRUARY 28, 2017  to


President Robert Millard

4915 Marine Drive

West Vancouver, B.C. V7W 2P5

tel: 604-926-1617  fax: 604-926-1119   Respondent



(signed) Roger Callow  February 28-2017

(Registered Mail receipt to WVTA affixed to the court copy)